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Introduction 
The administration of São Tomé’s rural interior and of some coastal rural areas—home of 
at least one third of the archipelago’s population—was mainly a two-man show in the early 
years after decolonization. While the crucial decisions about the future of the country’s 
main economic activity and source of agricultural wealth (the cocoa plantations or roças 
situated in these zones) were made at government level and in the president’s office, and 
while these plantations formally had a strong degree of self-administration in the form of 
the Comissões Administrativas Provisórias (Provisional Committees of Administration) 
later becoming the Comités de Acção Política (Committees of Political Action: both CAP), 
the control of everyday life lay in the hands of the labor inspectorate. Inspector-General 
Francisco Martins Xavier de Pina and his auxiliary, Américo Gonçalves da Graça do Es-
pírito Santo, had an enormous task and held power over the lives of thousands of workers 
on the plantations. Both officials had been appointed during the transition phase before 12 
July 1975, when São Tomé e Príncipe became an independent state.1 Struggling for a short 
time with the complicated bureaucratic heritage that had been left by the colonial admin-
istration, both officials rapidly established a routine of work. During 1976 the two officials 
were constantly active in visiting the different plantations, in hearing the complaints of 
laborers, plantation officials, and owners, and in processing information coming from the 
                                                
* The author’s research has been supported by Marie Curie Intra-European Fellowship no. 235130 and 
ERC Starting Grant no. 240898, both within the 7th European Community Framework Program. I would like 
to thank Maciel Santos and the Centro de Estudos Africanos da Universidade do Porto (CEAUP) for their 
valuable contribution to the progress of this research project. 
1 Carlos Gouveia Franco, president of the Instituto do Trabalho, Previdência e Acção Social (Institute 
of Labor, Providence and Social Action, hereafter ITPAS) of São Tomé e Príncipe to Portuguese Overseas 
Minister, Resumo da situação no sector do Trabalho, Previdência e Acção Social (without number), 6 Janua-
ry 1975, Curadoria Geral dos Serviçais e Indígenas, 1176, Arquivo Histórico de São Tomé e Príncipe, São 
Tomé, São Tomé e Príncipe (hereafter AHSTP). Francisco Martins Xavier de Pina and Américo Gonçalves 
da Graça do Espírito Santo came both from elite forro families, many of whose members held middle-level 
posts in the public service under the colonial state, and became installed in leading functions in the different 
São Tomé e Príncipe ministries after independence. Espírito Santo, who normally was director of a bureau of 
civil service affairs, had had some former experience as acting labor inspector from 1974, and entered the 
post in March 1975. Francisco Martins Xavier de Pina was installed as inspector-general in May 1975.  
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CAPs and channelling the wishes of these local cells to São Tomé’s ruling party, the Mo-
vimento de Libertação de São Tomé e Príncipe (MLSTP).2  
Still more important, however, was the jurisdiction that both officials exercised 
over the social life of the plantations. In 1976, both officials held a type of informal court 
that dealt with hundreds of cases. Workers could be disciplined by loss of wages (for one 
or more days), or threatened with dismissal, which could indirectly mean the loss of the 
land that many workers had treated as their own fields (lavras) after 1974. In cases that 
were interpreted as being more clearly “political”—that is, whenever the inspectors be-
lieved they had to do with saboteurs who wanted to weaken the progress of the independ-
ent state—the political police and party institutions became involved in the process. Even 
so, the inspectorate was in itself an important court of first instance, which therefore exert-
ed a powerful influence over the everyday life of plantation workers. 
From this perspective, São Tomé e Príncipe provides an instructive case for exam-
ining the complexities of decolonization in sub-Saharan Africa. Within the new, independ-
ent administrations of Africa’s postcolonial states, political and executive power was not 
always exclusively concentrated at the level of two or three leading ministries or in the 
offices of the presidency. Specialized bureaus, which often were a direct heritage of the 
colonial order, could retain a considerable amount of power. This can be illustrated in the 
cases of several gigantic development projects initiated under the late colonial regimes, of 
which arguably the most paradigmatic was the bureau, known as the Office du Niger, 
which administered the huge irrigation scheme in the Inner Niger Delta in French Soudan 
(present-day Mali) and which had a long and inefficient life until 1984.3 Sympathies for 
socialist rhetoric, if not strict Marxist doctrine, made recourse to these schemes additional-
ly attractive since, in many postcolonial countries, members of the leading political class 
were certain that technocratic planning was a way of directing the economies of their re-
spective countries into a new age.4 
Peasants or, as in the Santomean case, agricultural contract laborers experienced 
these phases of economic reorganization that followed the transfers of power. They had 
their own interests, and—even if one might argue that they were detached from processes 
happening at the level of the colonial capitals, the centers of political districts, or even in 
the colonial metropoles—they had their own memory of the last decades of colonial rule. 
This was all the more problematic as the late colonial period had been characterized by 
modernization and investment, and had, in nearly all cases, resulted in socioeconomic and 
                                                
2 See this transfer of information in Francisco Martins Xavier de Pina, Chief Labor Inspector, Ministry 
of Labor and Social Providence, to Inspector of Judicial Police (no. 720/A-2-C/976), 13 October 1976 (p. 1), 
Curadoria Geral dos Serviçais e Indígenas, 181 (cota 3.8.3.6.), AHSTP. 
3 On the history of the Office du Niger, see Emil Schreyger, L’Office du Niger au Mali 1932 à 1982: 
La problématique d’une grande entreprise agricole dans la zone du Sahel (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1984); Mon-
ica M. van Beusekom, “Disjunctures in Theory and Practice: Making Sense of Change in Agricultural De-
velopment at the Office du Niger, 1920–60,” Journal of African History 41, 1 (2000), 79–99. 
4 Crawford Young, Ideology and Development in Africa (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), 
100–103. 
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material improvement that could be felt in the lives of individuals.5 It is challenging to set 
these experiences against the concrete changes that took place in the years after independ-
ence, and to see in what ways they contributed to or impeded identification with the new 
societies.6 
São Tomé e Príncipe is an under-researched African country, and the fact that its 
vast archival documentation has not been extensively explored alone justifies fresh initia-
tives in the reconstruction of its history. Second, the country gains particular interest from 
being a “Creole state”: a country settled by a first generation of Luso-African “creoles,” 
the descendants of slaves, and then by successive waves of slaves and more or less forced 
laborers from Angola, Mozambique, and Cape Verde, many of whom were never repatriat-
ed.7 The fact that some series of the archives of São Tomé e Príncipe, such as those of the 
labor inspectorate, bridge the rupture of independence and are available to the historian up 
to 1980, makes research in these archives still more attractive. Two other facets contribute 
to the importance of studying São Tomé’s early postcolonial experience in comparison to 
others from the broader region: the archipelago had a population of laborers that was “eth-
nically” distinct from the “Creole” inhabitants of the settlements mainly situated around 
Trindade and the town of São Tomé, which facilitates a differentiated analysis of con-
flicts8; and the colonial metropole, Portugal, was particularly “backward” in terms of social 
modernization during the late colonial phase, which allows us to study a late colonial state 
with, apparently, a limited impact in its effect on colonial populations. 
Some studies have attempted to collect the memories of Santomean workers from 
the roças through series of interviews.9 However, the problems with this technique are, in 
                                                
5 Over the last two decades, there have been many more general comments on the role of the “late co-
lonial states,” but there is still rather little empirical work carried out on its effects. The obvious exception is 
the work of Frederick Cooper, which is joined by some other contributions. See Frederick Cooper, Africa 
since 1940: The Past of the Present (Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 38–53; Andreas 
Eckert, “Regulating the Social: Social Security, Social Welfare and the State in Late Colonial Tanzania,” 
Journal of African History 45, 3 (2004), 467–89; and, specifically for the Portuguese case, Malyn Newitt, 
“The Late Colonial State in Portuguese Africa,” Itinerario 22, 3–4 (1999), 110–22. 
6 Augusto Nascimento rightly holds that over the last decades, the “African element” in São Tomé’s 
Creole culture, while of course essential, has been overstated, see Augusto Nascimento, “Os são-tomenses e 
as mutações sociais na sua história recente,” Africana Studia 6 (2003), 33. Nevertheless, for an analysis of a 
late colonial experience, São Tomé e Príncipe is a significant example for an African colony.  
7 Philip J. Havik and Malyn Newitt, “Introduction,” in Philip J. Havik and Malyn Newitt, eds., Creole 
Societies in the Portuguese Colonial Empire (Bristol UK: University of Bristol, 2007), 5–23, 22. On the 
political history of independent São Tomé e Príncipe, the principal work remains Gerhard Seibert, Camara-
das, Clientes e Compadres: Colonialismo, Socialismo e Democratização em São Tomé e Príncipe (2nd ed., 
Lisbon: Vega, 2002, 132–92; the original edition is Comrades, Clients and Cousins. Colonialism, Socialism 
and Democratization in São Tomé and Príncipe [Leiden: CNWS Publications, 1999]. 
8 Marina Padrão Temudo, “De serviçal a camponês: A persistência das desigualdades sociais em São 
Tomé e Príncipe,” Lusotopie 15, 2 (2008), 76–79. 
9 The main work is Pablo B. Eyzaguirre, “Small Farmers and Estates in São Tomé, West Africa,” 
(Ph.D. thesis, Yale University, 1986). A summary of his positions can be found in Pablo B. Eyzaguirre, “The 
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the particular case of São Tomé’s plantations, quite considerable since former plantation 
workers and their descendants—of which a great number still continues to live on the plan-
tations in the decade of the 2000s—are particularly angry and frustrated with their situa-
tion, and have a tendency to paint the postcolonial decades in dark colors. This attitude 
appears to be nearly unanimous. Such prejudices scarcely give the historian an accurate 
picture that she or he could employ for reconstructing the past of the immediate postcolo-
nial period. Moreover, some of the informants alleged they might encounter problems 
through being directly interviewed, and it appears to be difficult to conceal the identity of 
those who provide information. To avoid these problems, this article will instead rely on 
the abundant wealth of untouched archival data, which I will relate, where possible, to the 
results of studies by Pablo B. Eyzaguirre, Augusto Nascimento, and others. It is my goal to 
give a picture of the situation that will allow sociologists and oral historians to continue 
their own work on a basis that is somewhat better established.10 
The Decolonization Experience of São Tomé e Príncipe: A Paradigmatic Case 
The example of the early independent Democratic Republic of São Tomé e Príncipe is par-
ticularly interesting and instructive in the context of postcolonial African states for a num-
ber of reasons. First, although the islands were a micro-state, in fact the smallest of the 
newly emergent independent states in Africa (not counting the Seychelles), such a small 
state was inhabited by a fascinatingly large number of different groups, whose ancestors 
had been transported to the place during different phases of Portuguese colonialism. Many 
inhabitants had been brought to work in the islands’ cocoa agriculture during the twentieth 
century and some of them had come to live in the archipelago only a couple of years before 
independence. Second, the structure of the islands’ economy included many examples of 
very large agricultural projects, in the case of the biggest of the plantations. While the ma-
jority of the roças were small complexes, others were large indeed. The roça Rio do Ouro 
was exceptionally large, and others were similarly impressive, employing together several 
thousands of the islands’ more than 10,000 plantation workers and giving a home to their 
family members.11 In 1975, at the moment of independence, all of the larger plantation 
complexes had passed through periods of considerable investment, leading to the installa-
                                                                                                                                              
Independence of São Tomé e Príncipe and Agrarian Reform,” Journal of Modern African Studies 27, 4 
(1989), 671–78. 
10 Maciel Morais Santos and Alexander Keese held conversations with workers on a number of roças 
(Monte Café with dependencies São Nicolau and Nova Moka; Colónia Açoriana; Água-Izé; Boa Entrada; 
Agostinho Neto [former Rio de Ouro], and Ponta Figo), on 14 and 15 June 2008. The problems encountered 
with the material stem from these conversations. 
11 Francisco José Tenreiro, A ilha de São Tomé (estudo geográfico) (Lisbon: Junta de Investigações do 
Ultramar, 1961), 151, gives the number of laborers on the roças for 1950 as 19,800. A 1972 inspection report 
gives the number of laborers as only 8,000, but this number needs to be multiplied by at least a factor of two 
to account for children and other family members who were not counted as laborers. See Feliciano Gameiro 
Santos, Administrative Inspector, Inspecção Administrativa Ordinária à Província de S. Tomé e Príncipe 
(without number), April/June 1972 (p. 54), MU/ISAU, A2.001.02/06.00025, Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino 
(hereafter AHU), Lisbon, Portugal. Eyzaguirre, Small Farmers, 364, estimates 17,500 inhabitants for the 
roças of Xe Mochi (former Trindade) district alone in 1986. 
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tion of state-of-the-art equipment, and of an infrastructure of health institutions. From the 
1960s onwards most roças had a reliable network of health posts, with the larger ones even 
boasting their own hospitals.12 Also, basic schooling was, for the Portuguese empire where 
illiteracy was widespread, relatively well represented.13 
The plantations, on the other hand, were the backbone of independent São Tomé e 
Príncipe’s economic future. What had once, in the first decades of the twentieth century, 
been the major producer of cocoa in all of sub-Saharan Africa, had already suffered a con-
siderable decline from the interwar period.14 Other colonial economies in the region, nota-
bly of Gold Coast (today Ghana) and, to a lesser degree, Togo, and postcolonial Ivory 
Coast in the 1960s, had challenged São Tomé’s position. The plantation economy of the 
islands had also been menaced by diseases attacking the particular type of cocoa plants 
used on the roças, and by mismanagement and lack of innovation on many of them. Never-
theless, the 1950s, 1960s, and early 1970s reaffirmed the archipelago’s solid position in 
cocoa exportation, even against the background of considerable volatility in cocoa prices 
on the world market.15 On the eve of independence, this seemed to provide an excellent 
economic basis for a new state, which in 1975 had only about 100,000 inhabitants, and 
perhaps 70,000 potential citizens.16 The leaders of the MLSTP government consequently 
regarded the direct control of these resources as a central objective of their administration. 
Thus, until 1977, President Manuel Pinto da Costa himself held the post of minister of ag-
riculture, and on 30 September 1975, twenty-three of the larger roças were nationalized.17 
                                                
12 A description of the roças in the late 1950s can be found in Tenreiro, Ilha, 141–60. 
13 A number of the larger plantation complexes offered such basic schooling by the early 1950s. This 
effort is remarkable in comparison to the metropole and the rest of the colonial empire. See José Francisco 
Rodrigues, Curator-General of Native Affairs, Relatório referente ao ano de 1952 [São Tomé] (without 
number), n.d., Curadoria Geral dos Serviçais e Indígenas, 1153 (cota 3.24.2.37), AHSTP, 127. 
14 Maciel Morais Santos, “A rentabilidade do cacau de S. Tomé e Príncipe: hipóteses de explicação,” 
Africana Studia 5 (2002), 181–212; William Gervase Clarence-Smith, “Cocoa Plantations and Coerced La-
bour in the Gulf of Guinea, 1870–1914,” in Martin E. Klein, ed., Breaking the Chains: Slavery, Bondage, 
and Emancipation in Modern Africa and Asia (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1993), 150–70; 
William Gervase Clarence-Smith, “O papel dos custos de trabalho no florescimento e declínio das plantações 
de cacau em São Tomé e Príncipe,” Revista Internacional de Estudos Africanos 14–15 (1991–1995), 7–34. 
15 On the evolution of the archipelago’s cocoa industry, see Alberto de Sousa, Comércio Externo de 
São Tomé e Príncipe (Subsídios para o Seu Estudo) (Lisbon: Junta de Investigações do Ultramar, 1963), 79–
83 (and annexes). Obviously, the production quotas reached by the roças were no longer at the level of those 
at the beginning of the twentieth century, but for many investors the plantation sector remained attractive. 
16 The 1970 census gives a population number of 73,800 inhabitants. This is, very probably, far too 
low, as there is no explanation for the greater than 30 percent increase in the population of São Tomé e Prín-
cipe in the following eleven years, given the exodus of nearly the entire European population and the repatri-
ation of many Mozambicans and Angolans. See Grupo de Trabalho para a Realização do IV Recenseamento 
Geral da População e Habitação, Censo da população e habitação: Notas explicativas (São Tomé: C.T.P.I.E., 
1970). 
17 There has been controversy over the motives of the forro leaders of the MLSTP with regard to the 
nationalization of the roças. Michel Cahen has argued that the nationalization and subsequent treatment of 
laborers had nothing to do with plans for social welfare, but with conservative measures of controlling a 
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The other 100 roças, which remained in the formal possession of private owners who were 
mostly absentees, would be subjected to ever-stricter vigilance, as by the creation of the 
CAPs.18 By 1978, the majority of the remaining plantations also came under direct state 
control. 
However, the real problem proved not to be the remaining “fascist” Portuguese 
plantation owners far away in Europe, who had already evacuated most of their European 
staff, but the workers themselves. Indeed, the plantation workers (who, including family 
members, might have totalled 20,000 or more individuals) lived an existence that was far 
removed—socially and emotionally—from the new elite that had taken over power in the 
small urban center of São Tomé Island and the other towns and villages. Evidently, the 
“creoles” of São Tomé e Príncipe (the forros), the freemen descended from the slave popu-
lations introduced during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, had not been recruited as 
laborers during the cocoa boom in the second half of the nineteenth century. The forros 
vehemently refused what they considered to be “slave labor.”19 Instead, the labor force had 
mostly been made up of recruits from Angola, gaps in whose ranks were later increasingly 
filled by Mozambicans and Cape Verdeans.20 These serviçais—as many studies have 
shown—had not always been voluntary laborers, and even in the 1920s the boundaries 
between free labor recruitment, forced labor redirected from infrastructure-building in the 
colony of Angola to the private sector of the far-off archipelago, and continuities of the 
slave system, had been blurred. The serviçais had been strictly separated from the “Creole” 
populations—not only were the roças often many hours or even days distant from the main 
concentrations of “Creole” inhabitants, but some of the forro families (who mostly had a 
mixed Afro-European—mestiço—background, but were regarded as “black” from the ra-
cialized Portuguese colonial perspective) had had their own tradition as plantation owners 
and slave-holders (although the majority of these families had been pushed out of the in-
dustry by the turn of the century). Unsurprisingly, many “creoles” regarded themselves as 
entirely different from the laborers on the roças—and refused to have any social relations 
to these laborers. Theoretically, during the period of Portuguese colonial rule, Angolan and 
other serviçais were to be repatriated after the end of their contract—normally after two to 
five years—but these provisions were, until the 1950s, quite frequently ignored. Therefore, 
even at independence there was a large group of Angolans (and also a number of Mozam-
bicans) on the roças who waited (if they had not given up hope) to be able to return to their 
                                                                                                                                              
foreign labor force; a position contested by Gerhard Seibert. See Michel Cahen, “Arquipélagos da alternân-
cia: A vitória da oposição nas ilhas de Cabo Verde e de São Tomé e Príncipe,” Revista Internacional de Es-
tudos Africanos 14–15 (1991), 126–31; and Gerhard Seibert and Michel Cahen in “Correspondência,” Revis-
ta Internacional de Estudos Africanos 16–17 (1992–1994), 353–65. 
18 Seibert, Camaradas, 164–72. 
19 Izequiel Batista de Sousa, São Tomé e Príncipe de 1485 à 1755: une société coloniale du blanc au 
noir (Paris: Harmattan, 2008), 296–300.  
20 The classical overview for the nineteenth century and early twentieth century is Augusto Nascimen-
to, Poderes e quotidiano nas roças de S. Tomé e Príncipe: De finais de oitocentos a meados de novecentos 
(Lisbon: author’s edition, 2002). 
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home villages.21 Many of these laborers had built (often loose) family ties, and had chil-
dren born on the roças, who were known as tongas.22 Given the protests from Portuguese 
colonial administrators and governors in Angola, who complained that “their” regions 
were being depleted of a potential workforce necessary to improve the local infrastructure 
and export agriculture, labor recruitment for São Tomé e Príncipe would in the 1940s and 
1950s target the other groups more strongly.23 Mozambicans were shipped to the islands in 
growing numbers, and they profited from a considerably improved system of repatriation 
(which means that many were really transported back into their regions of origin after the 
end of their contracts), while their practice of sending remittances home to their families 
worked far more efficiently than for the Angolan serviçais.24 A fourth group on the roças 
(besides the Angolan serviçais, the tongas, and Mozambicans) were the Cape Verdeans, 
whose recruitment for work on the plantations had restarted mainly in the late 1940s and 
1950s, after the experience of two severe famines in these islands.25 Like the forros, Cape 
Verdeans automatically enjoyed the status of civilizados because of the special legal posi-
tion of their home territory, which meant that they had a certain kind of Portuguese “impe-
rial citizenship.” This made them workers who were difficult to handle: unlike their Ango-
lan or Mozambican counterparts, the Cape Verdeans could not be subject to corporal pun-
ishment, and they were also not eligible for forced labor.26 Many Cape Verdeans were 
                                                
21 This situation is summarized as being common for 1945 in Jaime H. de Sá V. Couceiro, Director of 
Department of Marítime Affairs of Angola, São Tomé e Príncipe, Relatório da viagem feita pelo Capitão de 
Mar e Guerra Jaime H. de Sá Couceiro de 2 a 20 Setembro de 1945 (without number), n.d. (p. 37), 
MU/ISAU, Sala 3, 1725, AHU. 
22 Jean Michel Lebigre, “L’obó de São Tomé (République de São Tomé e Príncipe): Un exemple 
d’hinterland forestier insulaire,” Cahiers d’Outre-Mer 56, 224 (2003), 379–400. 
23 Vasco Lopes Alves, Governor-General of Angola, to Carlos da Sousa Gorgulho, Governor of São 
Tomé e Príncipe, Despacho: Confidencial (without number), 1 August 1945 (p. 1), MU/ISAU, Sala 3, 1725, 
AHU. 
24 Augusto Nascimento, Desterro e contrato: Moçambicanos a caminho de S. Tomé e Príncipe (anos 
1940–1960) (Maputo: Arquivo Histórico de Moçambique, 2002). 
25 Augusto Nascimento, O sul da diáspora: Cabo-verdianos em plantações de S. Tomé e Príncipe e 
Moçambique (Praia: Presidência da República de Cabo Verde, 2003). 
26 Augusto Nascimento, O fim do caminhu longi (Mindelo: Ilhéu Editora, 2007), 22–30, 35–36. The 
fear of the collusion of recalcitrant Cape Verdean workers on the roças with Cape Verdean officials in the 
Portuguese colonial service in São Tomé e Príncipe, is discussed in Alexander Keese, “The Role of Cape 
Verdeans in War Mobilization and War Prevention in Portugal’s African Empire, 1955–1965,” International 
Journal of African Historical Studies 40, 3 (2007), 507. A summarizing report about “turbulent behavior” of 
the Cape Verdeans, after one decade of revived Cape Verdean contract labor in São Tomé e Príncipe, is giv-
en in Octávio Ferreira Gonçalves, Acting Governor of São Tomé e Príncipe, to Raul Ventura, Portuguese 
Overseas Minister (no. 675/56/950), 19 November 1956 (pp. 3–4), Repartição Provincial dos Serviços da 
Administração Civil (RPSAC), SC:A\SR:A/Cx173 (0022), Arquivo Histórico Nacional de Cabo Verde 
(hereafter AHNCV), Praia, Republic of Cape Verde; another report can be found in Adelino Macedo, Cura-
tor-General of Serviçais and Natives of São Tomé e Príncipe, to Manuel Marques de Abrantes Amaral, Gov-
ernor of Cape Verde, Informação, (no. 23/957), 19 June 1957 (pp. 2–3), RPSAC, SC:A\SR:A/Cx173 (0022), 
AHNCV. 
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ready enough to embark for São Tomé, given the agricultural disasters that had shaken 
their own archipelago and caused tens of thousands of deaths through the 1940s.27 Apart 
from Augusto Nascimento’s studies, little work has been done on the Cape Verdean Dias-
pora on São Tomé, which remained an uneasy presence on the roças.28 In the twenty-first 
century, on the larger roças such as Agostinho Neto (former roça of Rio do Ouro), these 
peasants are the only group of plantation workers to profit from the existence of corporate 
associations—a type of union—and they receive some (limited) material support from the 
Cape Verdean government.29 In the colonial period, there are regular reports of violence on 
the roças between Cape Verdeans and other groups of laborers, which, however, sharply 
decrease as a subject in correspondence after independence. In 1955 the position of the 
Cape Verdeans on the roças was summed up as follows by the colonial labor inspectorate: 
The attitudes of the Cape Verdean workers have a pernicious influence on indige-
nous serviçais coming from Angola and Mozambique and, in parallel to frequent 
                                                
27 Augusto Barreto de Carvalho, Administrator of concelho of Santa Catarina, Santiago Island, Cape 
Verde, Ano de 1943: Relatório sobre estado do Concelho (without number), 22 April 1944, RPSAC, 
SC:A\SR:F\Cx124 (1503), AHNCV; João Coelho Perreira Serra, Administrator of concelho of Ribeira Gran-
de, Santo Antão, Cape Verde, to Director of Central Department of Civil Administration Services of Cape 
Verde (without number), 30 September 1957, RPSAC, SC:A\SR:A/Cx173 (0022), AHNCV. The statement 
in 1959 by Cape Verdean administrator Luís Rendall Silva that there had never been any forced recruitment 
during the 1940s and 1950s, and that the colonial government had never attempted to “dupe” Cape Verdeans 
into accepting labor in São Tomé e Príncipe, appears to be credible. See Luís Silva Rendall, Administrator of 
Sub-District (concelho) of Fogo), Administração do Concelho do Fogo: Ano Civil de 1958 (without number), 
24 February 1959 (p. 67), Repartição Provincial dos Serviços da Administração Civil (RPSAC), 
SC:A\SR:C\Cx123, 1492, AHNCV. António Carreira’s earlier claim that there had been forced recruitment, 
in António Carreira, Cabo Verde (Aspectos sociais. Secas e fomes do século XX) (2nd ed., Lisbon: Ulmeiro, 
1984), 173–80—retaken in Luís Batalha, The Cape Verdean Diaspora in Portugal: Colonial Subjects in a 
Postcolonial World (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2004), 39—is not supported by reliable evidence, and 
Augusto Nascimento has shown for his own study that there is little available documentation to substantiate 
such claims.  
28 Augusto Nascimento, Vidas de S. Tomé segundo vozes de Soncente (Mindelo: Ilhéu Editora: 2008), 
23; 52–53, 58–59; 72–73 (racist attitudes of Cape Verdeans); 80–81 (voluntary versus forced migration); 88–
89 (modalities of recruitment). The living conditions of Cape Verdeans on the roças are also studied, albeit 
not with a systematic historical perspective, in Marina Berthet Ribeiro, “Transformações Sociais e Dinâmicas 
Locais nas Antigas Dependências Agrícolas de São Tomé e Príncipe” (Ph.D. thesis, Universidade de São 
Paulo, 2005), 167–68. 
29 While a large part of the Angolans and most Mozambicans were repatriated in the aftermath of de-
colonization, many tongas remain on the plantations. Even so, by 1975 persons of Cape Verdean descent 
were likely to be in the majority on many of the roças. See Joaquim dos Santos Domingues, Labour Inspec-
torate of São Tomé e Príncipe, to Carlos Gouveia Franco, President of ITPAS, Informação: Instalações para 
Trabalhadores Rurais na Roça Rio do Ouro, 6 May 1970 (p. 1), Curadoria Geral dos Serviçais e Indígenas, 
648 (cota 3.22.4.2), AHSTP; Eyzaguirre, Small Farmers, 350. 
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disorders between the members of these groups, we registered some other cases of 
indiscipline of a type that rarely tended to appear before.30 
After independence, conflicts and violence between members of the different 
groups on the roças appear to have become less frequent. It is of course possible that the 
new, African labor inspectors were less interested in the origins of workers—a point that 
will play a role in discussing these inspectors’ activities—and more insistent upon their 
role in building up the postcolonial economy. However, it is also quite plausible that the 
larger socioeconomic problems on the plantations after 1975, which we will analyze in the 
following section, reduced internal group conflicts among the laborers, as they were all hit 
by the same socioeconomic difficulties. 
1976: The Transition to the Postcolonial Economy in Practice 
With the coming of independence, inspectors Xavier de Pina and Espírito Santo would 
now have to cope with the expectations, hopes, and fears of this very large mixed popula-
tion. The energy shown by the officials in helping to foment the “well-being of the na-
tion”—the bem da nação—is quite obvious from their early correspondence, and it is clear 
that this was not just lip service to the new, Socialist-style rhetoric popular with the early 
MLSTP regime in São Tomé e Príncipe. However, their initial motivation rapidly became 
frustrated. The inspectors initially gave big speeches to explain the importance of the indi-
vidual worker in the building-process of the nation, but after a couple of months they lim-
ited themselves to taking punitive measures. Again and again, the inspectors believed 
themselves to be faced with recalcitrant individuals who did not wish to work according to 
the timetables specified in their contracts; who disappeared for days in “the bush,” where 
they apparently cultivated their own hidden banana or manioc plantations; who did not 
follow the discipline to be established by the overseers; and who on several occasions even 
burned or destroyed the valuable cocoa trees.  
The latter type of incident remained particularly disturbing from the point of view 
of the inspectors, who could not find an explanation for such behavior. Were these actions 
the consequence of widespread alcoholism, as part of a larger, social problem to be tackled 
by the new state? Or did they constitute the expression of a desire to sabotage the progress 
of the nation? Schooled in Marxist rhetoric, Xavier de Pina tended to see the incidents as 
clear indications of counter-revolutionary behavior (which was absurd enough among a 
population of laborers living on remote plantations, and whose horizons were a million 
miles away from high politics). Given these “subversive trends,” the program of the in-
spection set by the inspectors themselves was simple enough: 
The inspectorate, which in a general way is responsible for the protection of the la-
bourers, will not hesitate to punish them whenever it verifies any act of indiscipline 
                                                
30 Adelino Macedo, Curator-General of Native Affairs, Relatório [São Tomé 1955] (without number), 
n.d. (p. 2), Curadoria Geral dos Serviçais e Indígenas, 1153 (cota 3.24.2.37), AHSTP. 
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on the part of these labourers. These [acts] have here gained enormous propor-
tions.31 
The tribunals presided over by the inspectors during 1976 are full of such acts. In 
the following paragraphs, we will discuss some of the categories in which these acts fall. 
The “crimes” discussed are representative of many more and if we only count those events 
into which official inquiries were held, they already amount to hundreds of cases. 
Illegal harvesting of bananas, intended for the export commerce, by individual 
workers or groups of workers who now considered them as part of their diet, was a typical 
“crime.” On the roça Santa Luzia, for instance, such acts happened frequently, and with 
the connivance of a large number of workers.32 As in the case of the worker Beleiro Vie-
gas of the roça Laura, the inspectors attempted to find the leaders of such “acts of sabo-
tage” and to expel them from the plantations.33 
The destruction of cocoa plants was, however, regarded as much more serious be-
cause there was, from the point of view of the inspectors, no rational explanation. When-
ever drunkenness could be given as a reason—workers like Carlos Cabral of the dependen-
cy Nova Olinda of Água-Izé plantation appear to have known very well that a confession 
in this sense could save them from worse punishment—the judgments could be rather mild. 
Cabral had to pay 500 São Tomean escudos, which was less than a third of his monthly 
salary.34 In the cases of the workers Gabriel Borges and Miguel dos Santos Cipriano on 
Água-Izé, who had hacked out cocoa plants, as in the case of João Maria Soares on the 
subdivision (dependência) Anselmo Andrade of the same roça, there was no such justifica-
tion, and the inspectors advocated a firm response.35 Some acts, like the one provoked by 
Manuel do Rosário Afonso de Barros who started a fire on the roça Ponta Figo and, per-
haps accidentally, destroyed 515 cocoa trees, could be interpreted as “accidents” caused by 
the illegal agricultural activities of the workers.36 However, the inspectors were not con-
                                                
31 Francisco Martins Xavier de Pina to Sociedade Agrícola Ribeira Afonso Lda. (no. 145/A-2-B/976), 
21 February 1976, Curadoria Geral dos Serviçais e Indígenas, 181 (cota 3.8.3.6.), AHSTP.  
32 Américo G. da Graça do Espirito Santo, Labor Inspector, to António Manuel Pereira de Carvalho, 
owner of Casa Novo Mundo (no. 269/A-2-A/976), 15 April 1976, Curadoria Geral dos Serviçais e Indígenas, 
181 (cota 3.8.3.6.), AHSTP. 
33 Américo G. da Graça de Espirito Santo to António Manuel Pereira de Carvalho (no. 212/0-1/976), 
23 March 1976, Curadoria Geral dos Serviçais e Indígenas, 181 (cota 3.8.3.6.), AHSTP. 
34 Francisco Martins Xavier de Pina to Technical Overseer of Zona 8, Roça Água Izé (no. 98/Q-2-
Q/976), 6 February 1976, Curadoria Geral dos Serviçais e Indígenas, 181 (cota 3.8.3.6.), AHSTP. 
35 Franscisco Martino Xavier de Pina to Inspector of Judicial Police (no. 785/A-2-A/976), 19 Novem-
ber 1976, Curadoria Geral dos Serviçais e Indígenas, 181 (cota 3.8.3.6.), AHSTP; Franscisco Martino Xavier 
de Pina to President of Tribunal Especial Para Actos Contra Revolucionários (Extraordinary Court against 
Counter-Revolutionary Activities) (no. 818/A-2-A/976), 3 December 1976, Curadoria Geral dos Serviçais e 
Indígenas, 181 (cota 3.8.3.6.), AHSTP; Franscisco Martino Xavier de Pina to President of CAP of Roça 
Água-Izé (no. 746/A-2-C/976), 25 October 1976, Curadoria Geral dos Serviçais e Indígenas, 181 (cota 
3.8.3.6.), AHSTP. 
36 Francisco Martins Xavier de Pina to Inspector of Judicial Police (no. 631/A-2-B/976), 7 September 
1976, Curadoria Geral dos Serviçais e Indígenas, 181 (cota 3.8.3.6.), AHSTP. 
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vinced that these incidents were not due to attempts of “subversion,” rather than being 
merely unauthorized agricultural activities and whenever, as in the case of the plantation 
Uba Budo, these phenomena became generalized, they reacted in a way that showed their 
deep concern: 
After the visit paid on 13 July to the branch Uba Budo Velho (roça Uba Budo) I 
noted that the workers of the dependency in question caused serious damage to the 
existing palm trees, and also in some areas to the cocoa trees. They cut down some 
palm trees, pulled out others, burned down cocoa plants etc. 
Given that these acts are not in line with the projects we wish to realize, we have 
formed the opinion that these workers need to suffer punishment, in order that these 
practices are not repeated in other agricultural zones.37 
By comparison, drunken workers, such as Militão Sanches Rodrigues from roça 
Rio Leça, who showed indiscipline “against the party programme” of MLSTP and was 
punished with the loss of ten days’ wages, were regarded as more “normal.”38 Insults 
against the members of the Comités de Acção Política, such as those by Manuel do 
Rosário Afonso de Barros, from the roça Ponta Figo, were a more serious problem, as 
were ways of talking classified as “subversive,” such as those by José Cabangala.39 On the 
other hand there was little willingness to interfere in “normal brawls” between workers 
(one of the main preoccupations of members of the labor inspectorate during the late colo-
nial period) and there had to be armed fights, like that between Manuel d’Apresentação 
Monteiro da Costa and António Francisco Boa Esperança in roça Uba Budo, to trigger the 
intervention of the labor inspectors.40 Also, there was little interest in “normal” absences, 
such as those of Felizberto Dionísio da Silva Torres and Paulino d’Alva Torres, or by Osó-
rio Carlos Coelho and others from the roça Água Izé.41 
There was greater concern about “turbulent workers,” who might later on become 
“subversive.” Early in 1976, workers of the roça Santy, (such as Jacinto Paulino, Paulo 
                                                
37 Francisco Martins Xavier de Pina to CAP of Roça Uba Budo (no. 513/A-2-A/976), 16 July 1976, 
Curadoria Geral dos Serviçais e Indígenas, 181 (cota 3.8.3.6.), AHSTP. 
38 Franscisco Martins Xavier de Pina to Administrator of Roça Rio Leça (no. A-2-B/976), 31 October 
1976 (p. 1), Curadoria Geral dos Serviçais e Indígenas, 181 (cota 3.8.3.6.), AHSTP. 
39 Francisco Martins Xavier de Pina to Inspector of Judicial Police (no. 690/A-2-A/976), 28 September 
1976, Curadoria Geral dos Serviçais e Indígenas, 181 (cota 3.8.3.6.), AHSTP; Américo G. da Graça de Espi-
rito Santo to Acting Administrator of Roça Ponta Figo (no. 680/A-2-A/976), 24 September 1976, Curadoria 
Geral dos Serviçais e Indígenas, 181 (cota 3.8.3.6.), AHSTP. 
40 Francisco Martins Xavier de Pina to President of CAP of Roça Uba Budo (no. 653/A-2-B/976), 17 
September 1976, Curadoria Geral dos Serviçais e Indígenas, 181 (cota 3.8.3.6.), AHSTP. 
41 Américo G. da Graça de Espirito Santo to Manager of Company João Ribeiro Lda. (no. 237/A-2-
A/976), 1 April 1976, Curadoria Geral dos Serviçais e Indígenas, 181 (cota 3.8.3.6.), AHSTP; Francisco 
Martins Xavier de Pina to Tecnical Overseer of Zona 8, Roça Água Izé (no. 97/A-1-A/976), 6 February 1976, 
Curadoria Geral dos Serviçais e Indígenas, 181 (cota 3.8.3.6.), AHSTP. 
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Álvaro, Marta da Paz, and Catarina Mendes Tavares) were accused of being “turbulent.”42 
André Vaqueiro de Ceita Soares on the roça Montes Hermínios, Evangelista Pires on roça 
Palmar, Celestino Quaresma Soares and Maria Mutulia on roça Quinta das Palmeiras, and 
António de Déus Quinde and Felizberto Correia Pinto on Água-Izé, were all part of the 
group of those accused of being “turbulent” and potentially “subversive” individuals.43 
Sometimes, in these cases, the labor inspectors set up joint tribunals with the CAP from the 
roças. In case of constant “lack of compliance,” dismissal of the “rebellious” worker was 
always a last option, as in the case of Augusto Pinto on roça Santy.44 More usually, as in 
the case of Lucílio Lopes and Armando Rosa on roça Piedade (on Príncipe Island), the 
turbulent workers were punished with payment of fines into the Fundo de Acção Social, a 
source of funds to finance some minor social projects, which tended to dry up rapidly.45 
These problems did not at all disappear during 1976. Exemplary punishment for 
some “turbulent,” i.e., disobedient laborers, ceremoniously announced in front of the entire 
labor force of a given roca (or section of a roça in the case of the larger plantation com-
plexes) did not bring the desired results. Moreover, the laborers turned out to be rather hes-
itant to pay the “voluntary” contributions to the Committees of Political Action on the 
plantations, which were dominated by the few forros active on the roças, who normally 
held the specialized or administrative roles. In a number of cases, the workers directly ac-
cused the leaders of the committees of embezzling their money. The inspectors were un-
sure what to make of these claims, but they normally defended the position of the party. 
This only led to further trouble. In late 1976, Xavier de Pina and Espírito Santo repeatedly 
deplored the “indiscipline at work [shown by many laborers], lack of respect and of re-
sponse to orders, all of which contradicted in the most absolute way the programme of 
government and of the MLSTP.”46 The “lack of respect” that was reported by the inspec-
tors concerned both the directing committees of the nationalized plantations and the re-
maining plantation managers of the smaller roças.  
                                                
42 Américo G. da Graça de Espirito Santo to Acting Administrator of Roça Santy (no. 24/A-2-A/976), 
8 January 1976, Curadoria Geral dos Serviçais e Indígenas, 181 (cota 3.8.3.6.), AHSTP. 
43 Francisco Martins Xavier de Pina to Acting Administrator of Roça Montes Hermínios (no. 138/A-2-
B/976), 19 February 1976, Curadoria Geral dos Serviçais e Indígenas, 181 (cota 3.8.3.6.), AHSTP; Américo 
G. da Graça do Espirito Santo to Carlos Alberto Gomes da Silva, Administrator of Roça Palmar (no. 164/A-
2-A/976), 4 March 1976, Curadoria Geral dos Serviçais e Indígenas, 181 (cota 3.8.3.6.), AHSTP; Américo G. 
da Graça do Espirito Santo to Acting Administrator of Roça Quinta das Palmeiras (no. 191/A-2-A/976), 11 
March 1976, Curadoria Geral dos Serviçais e Indígenas, 181 (cota 3.8.3.6.), AHSTP; Francisco Martins Xa-
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Indígenas, 181 (cota 3.8.3.6.), AHSTP. 
44 Américo G. da Graça do Espirito Santo to Acting Administrator of Roça Santy (no. 62/A-2-B/976), 
16 January 1976, Curadoria Geral dos Serviçais e Indígenas, 181 (cota 3.8.3.6.), AHSTP. 
45 Francisco Martins Xavier de Pina to Roça Piedade (no. 142/A-2-B/976), 20 February 1976, Curado-
ria Geral dos Serviçais e Indígenas, 181 (cota 3.8.3.6.), AHSTP. 
46 Franscisco Martino Xavier de Pina to Administrator of Roça Rio Leça (no. A-2-B/976), 31 October 
1976, Curadoria Geral dos Serviçais e Indígenas, 181 (cota 3.8.3.6.), AHSTP. 
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Complainants among the workers on the plantations were treated in a harsh and un-
friendly manner by the inspectorate. The inspectors officially demanded more respect for 
the rules that they had laid down. Usually, however, this was an excuse to take a position 
against the potentially “turbulent” individuals among the workers, as in the case of a dele-
gation from the plantation Santa Luzia that “complained about supposed infractions com-
mitted by the acting administrator of the plantation, such as: having cut down fruit trees, 
having distributed excessive tasks, and having forced the personnel to do some extra 
work.” The labor inspectors stated that there was no proof at all of these allegations, and 
punished the workers for calumny with the usual payment of fines into the Fundo de Acção 
Social.47 
On some occasions the labor inspectors were sympathetic to the concerns of the 
workers, particularly when it came to the payment of outstanding wages from the colonial 
period, or when it was a question of the future of laborers on the smaller roças that had not 
been “nationalized.” In several cases, in the first two years after independence, it was un-
certain whether individual Portuguese owners would somehow maintain their engagement, 
and under what conditions.48 For some smaller plantations, such as roças Granja and Sole-
dade, it was obvious that the owners would not return, nor attempt to claim any rights on 
these plantations, but it remained open who would pay the outstanding wages and eventual 
costs of repatriation.49 Where nationalization had been implemented or the government 
had imposed acting administrators, other problems prevailed. On the plantation Colónia 
Açoreana, the CAP refused to pay the wages that were due.50 On roça Santa Margarida, 
where the acting administrator complied with the new wage scales, he claimed that it was 
impossible to pay the raised wages within existing budgets, and that the new situation ne-
cessitated dismissals.51 
Part of the worker discontent that materialized since this period is reflected in the 
disillusion expressed by local workers interviewed on several roças in June 2008, where it 
becomes clear that the tongas, the remaining Angolan serviçais who were veterans of plan-
tation agriculture in São Tomé, but also the Cape Verdean workers now in the majority, 
regarded the story of the roças after 1975 as a history of decline, due to deliberate neglect 
and mismanagement on the part of the forro elite. Although these individual statements 
                                                
47 Francisco Martins Xavier de Pina to Acting Administrator of Roça Santa Luzia (no. 312/A-2-A/976), 
30 April 1976 (pp. 1–2), Curadoria Geral dos Serviçais e Indígenas, 181 (cota 3.8.3.6.), AHSTP. 
48 Francisco Martins Xavier de Pina to Eugénio da Conceição Cunha, Ilhéu Santo Amaro (no. 78/N-
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49 Francisco Martins Xavier de Pina to Fausto Ferreira da Fonseca (no. 50/N-13/976), 14 January 1976, 
Curadoria Geral dos Serviçais e Indígenas, 181 (cota 3.8.3.6.), AHSTP. 
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23 January 1976, Curadoria Geral dos Serviçais e Indígenas, 181 (cota 3.8.3.6.), AHSTP. 
51 Francisco Martins Xavier de Pina to Technical Overseer of Roça Santa Margarida (no. 13/A-1-
E/976), 6 January 1976 (p. 1), Curadoria Geral dos Serviçais e Indígenas, 181 (cota 3.8.3.6.), AHSTP. 
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lack a clear sense of chronology, they give an impression of the atmosphere that was re-
flected in the inspectors’ reports.52 
The inspectorate was obviously part of the problem. As we have seen, the inspec-
tors carried out their activity for the most part in a punitive manner. They saw counter-
revolutionary enemies of the new state nearly everywhere, and enforced rather harsh 
measures against these individuals. Cape Verdean workers may have been their principal 
targets—this can be deduced from the names appearing in the documents, although the 
margins of error are rather great (several of these names could be tongas or the few re-
maining Angolans)—but all former serviçais lived through a period of hard treatment.53  
The Contrast: Experiences of Liberalization in the 1950s, 1960s, and Early 1970s 
Conflicts with the new national labor inspectorate experienced by roças workers in the 
years after independence contrast in a seemingly odd way with the cruel history of abuses 
on the plantations under Portuguese rule. In this section, I will analyze the link between the 
two phenomena, going back to the phase of the late colonial state, between 1945 and 1974, 
and investigating the role of the colonial labor inspectorate in this period. What were the 
experiences of laborers on the roças under the predecessors of Xavier de Pina and Espírito 
Santo? For the period before the late 1940s, the picture seems clear. Among specialists in 
the history of the Portuguese colonial empire, it is generally accepted that the late Portu-
guese Republic and the early Estado Novo had come under serious pressure through accu-
sations from the International Labor Organization, which had held that the plantation re-
gime in the 1920s was merely the continuation of the structures of slavery under a different 
name.54 In the 1940s little seemed to have changed on the surface. There were serious 
abuses in the treatment of workers, and the whole recruitment process, at least in Angola, 
still reminded the more sensitive colonial administrators of versions of slavery.55  
However, it was at the level of the labor inspectorates where ideas began to change. 
In the first half of the 1940s, some Portuguese inspectors had developed a distinct view of 
the needs of São Tomé’s plantation workers, and loudly denounced the massive shortcom-
ings of the treatment of workers on the roças.56 Poor hygienic conditions on several roças, 
                                                
52 Personal communications provided to  Alexander Keese and Maciel Santos on 16 June 2008. 
53 Nevertheless, concerning requests for Santomean citizenship, there is no extraordinary percentage of 
Cape Verdean roça workers. See as examples, Pascoal Ayres Pires dos Santos, Director of Services of Terri-
torial Administration, Atestado [Alberto Correia Mendonça] (no. 265/979), 7 March 1979, Ministério da 
Administração Interna, 003 (Cota 1.12.2.12), Vários, AHSTP; Osório Umbelina dos Prazeres, District 
Commissioner of Água Grande, Atestado [Pedro Alves Fonseca] (no. 133/980), 6 February 1980, Ministério 
da Administração Interna, 003 (Cota 1.12.2.12), Vários, AHSTP. 
54 See the broader context in Miguel Bandeira Jerónimo, Livros Brancos, Almas Negras: A “missão ci-
vilizadora” do colonialismo português, c. 1870–1930 (Lisbon: Imprensa de Ciências Sociais, 2010), 211–49. 
55 Secretary of Administration of Sub-District (circunscrição) of Menongue, Angola, [Relatório] 
(without number), 19 March 1942 (p. 11), MU/ISAU, Sala 3, 1725, AHU. 
56 Part of this process is discussed in Alexander Keese, Living with Ambiguity: Integrating an African 
Elite in French and Portuguese Africa, 1930–61 (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2007), 166–67. 
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the distribution of rotten food, workers living for weeks on a couple of bananas per day—
these scandals, while unknown to the public in the authoritarian Portuguese state, led in the 
late 1940s to gradual but real changes in the Portuguese attitude towards the plantation 
owners and their managers. In 1946 the labor inspectorate came to the following, damning 
verdict: 
The reality today is the following: many agriculturalists of São Tomé organize their 
agricultural possessions on the basis of slave labor—and there is no euphemism 
that would allow us to change this expression, because this is not “forced labour” or 
“compulsory labour,” terms which with regard to other African colonies corre-
spond, in their reality and their expression, to other forms and other processes.57 
This comparison with slavery was a powerful blow. Over the following years, the 
labor inspectors insisted that the central government needed to be better informed about 
these abuses, which had obviously been untouched for years and which had to end.58 In 
1948, the Portuguese curator-general of native affairs in São Tomé emphasized that from 
the end of the Second World War, a “new spirit” and a wish for more social justice had 
become a reality on the islands.59 
This does not mean that the practices of recruitment and the living conditions on 
the roças changed from one day to the other. Moreover, the attitudes of colonial adminis-
trators in the colonies of recruitment remained strongly negative towards the liberalization 
of these processes. In 1951, the administrator of the concelho (the suburban district) of 
Malange in Angola dismissed the idea of creating a rural model settlement with repatriated 
workers from São Tomé e Príncipe with the argument that, now, only criminal elements 
were forcibly sent to the archipelago, which even after four years of hard service were not 
at all disciplined enough to constitute a reliable labor force in Angola!60  Nevertheless, 
these administrators took the remittances of workers who had died during their service in 
São Tomé, and used them to boost the meagre public funds in Angola’s regions. 
Notwithstanding these delays, the decade of the 1950s saw a complete revision of 
practices of recruitment, and of labor conditions in São Tomé e Príncipe. The labor inspec-
torate (or curadoria), both on the islands and in Angola, would be the key institution which 
brought about these changes, together with colonial labor inspectors based in Lisbon. By 
1950 the rhetoric of the inspectors had already undergone a complete change, although the 
authoritarian structures of the Portuguese Estado Novo clearly slowed down this process. 
In spite of this, the inspectors became quite insistent that concrete changes were needed on 
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Histórico de Angola, Luanda, Angola (hereafter AHA). 
388     Alexander Keese 
 
the roças, and they celebrated a number of successes during the decade of the 1950s. One 
early battle was for permission for contracted workers to bring their spouses or consorts 
and, in this context, the inspectorate strongly criticized the bad intentions or apathy of the 
colonial officials in the Angolan recruitment zones in question: 
The request was transmitted to the agencies of the service of native affairs, in Du-
que de Bragança and in Huambo. As regards the first one, the response was nega-
tive, similar, unfortunately, to earlier responses, perhaps because some authorities 
or agents of the authorities were uninterested or lazy, and these latter did not come 
to the see intrigues [from the side of plantation owners and others who did not want 
the extra cost] and, more concretely, an adequate moral and social understanding of 
the fact, in all its important significance.61 
Also, as in the inquiries made by the Intendant of Cuanza-Sul in Angola, there was 
now reluctance simply to accept the transport of potential criminals to São Tomé e Prínci-
pe.62 Moreover, there was growing awareness that the cipaios, the guards and auxiliaries in 
the service of the administration, had their own vested interests and were eager to extort 
bribes from locals who would then be spared from being sent to the archipelago.63 Given 
the African population’s constant fear of being consigned to this fate, common throughout 
Angola, there was always a potential for similar acts. 
These changing attitudes of Portuguese officials during the 1950s increased the 
pressure on the more abusive owners of plantations, while the compliant administrators 
and owners, such as those on the large Rio do Ouro plantation, were now publicly cele-
brated as exemplary.64 Feeling the changes inside the inspectorate, many of the serviçais 
and tongas on the roças believed they could now more easily obtain what they regarded as 
their rights. Therefore the manager of the roça Laura reported in March 1950, with some 
nervousness, that “the serviçal Quiolano came on Sunday in my presence, and said, with 
authoritarian gestures, that on the following day he would depart, with his whole family to 
the post of the labor inspectorate,” to have a case resolved concerning his wish to change 
the plantation on which he worked in order to be united with his family (such unions had 
often been impeded by the owners).65 This episode is representative of many others. Obvi-
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ously, it was now in a growing number of cases no longer the owners and managers but the 
workers who found that the ears of the Portuguese inspectors were open to them.66 
An early document, but one which is representative for many later files, was the re-
port of the Labor Inspector (the curador) Octávio Ferreira Gonçalves, from July 1947. 
Gonçalves commented, indignantly, on the unhygienic state of several plantations. The 
verdict on the situation of the roça Cruz Grande was particularly severe: 
More hygiene and a better organisation of everything is recommended, because on-
ly in this way will the serviçais on this roça feel better.67 
Some plantation managers, like the administrator of the Sociedade Agrícola da Ro-
zema, did indeed respond to these pressures. They would dismiss particularly brutal over-
seers and discipline others to make them respect the provisions of the law.68 In the late 
1940s this still did not amount to very much. Nonetheless, what was evident from the point 
of view of the serviçais was the first notable improvement of their overall situation. This 
improvement was associated, in particular, with the engagement of the Governor Carlos da 
Sousa Gorgulho, who without doubt gave unconditional support to the active labor inspec-
tors.69 One of Gorgulho’s major projects under the Estado Novo was substituting the con-
tract laborers coming from other overseas provinces with forro laborers. It remains unclear 
if the governor and his closest collaborators only attempted to employ pressure through the 
instrument of higher personal tax for the forros, or if it clandestinely involved routs and 
coercive labor.70 In any case, Gorgulho’s overall plans provoked outrage and open defi-
ance by São Tomé’s forro population. 
In the course of these events and their bloody results, Gorgulho has become, in the 
forro experience of Portuguese rule, the particular villain of the story. In particular he was 
responsible for the so-called Batepá Massacre, the February 1953 incident during which a 
number of suspected rebels from the São Tomean elite were brutally tortured and even 
murdered.71 However, the role of the plantation workers in these events is more complex. 
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Some of the plantation workers were mobilized against the alleged rebels and took part in 
the killings.72 Moreover, while this might only have been a strategy of Gorgulho’s, condi-
tions on the roças effectively began to improve in the period of his government. Therefore, 
there was no need for the plantation laborers to share the forro vision of his role. 
During the 1960s and early 1970s, the successes of the Portuguese labor inspec-
torate stabilized.73 They were eventually accelerated by worries that the international pres-
sures for decolonization and the effects of the anticolonial wars in other Portuguese colo-
nies might affect São Tomé e Príncipe. On many of the roças, the living conditions im-
proved steadily, and, at the moment of independence, the owners had been pressured to 
install rather modern facilities, and to treat the workers in a more decent way. For example, 
in 1963, the inspector of labor visiting the roça Monte Café, criticized the installations, the 
state of medical support, and nutrition.74 The contrast with this earlier state of affairs was 
clear when in 1971, the inspectors were enthusiastic about the improvements, and occupied 
themselves with questions of basic education in the roça’s kindergarten!75 This trend to-
wards a sharp critique of the regime on the roças had already grown during the late 
1950s.76 Any lack of compliance on the part of the proprietors was no longer tolerated. On 
smaller roças, like Filipina or Mulembú, where the owners were reluctant to improve con-
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ditions, the critique of the labor inspectors became increasingly aggressive and made re-
forms unavoidable.77 
In 1974, at the moment of the overthrow of the post-Salazarist dictatorship, the 
evolution of labor conditions on the plantations had gone a long way. The labor inspectors 
had been the principal vehicles of the Portuguese late colonial state, in its attempt to estab-
lish more modern and more beneficial conditions on the roças. The workers, while contin-
uing to live in an authoritarian and exploitative system, fared incomparably better than 
those of thirty years previously, and part of this improvement could be attributed to the 
labor inspections, which were identified with progress throughout the late colonial system. 
Conclusion: Late Colonial “Modernism” and Experiences of Decline and Disap-
pointment—Understanding the Heritage of the Late Colonial State 
Given these improvements, even within a colonial empire based on authoritarian princi-
ples, it is not surprising that the laborers on the plantations of São Tomé e Príncipe were 
hoping to see further improvements after independence. At first glance, the disappearance 
of the Portuguese administration meant the retreat of the “fascist” plantation owners, and a 
possible Africanization of the structures of control of the roças.78 However, in effect, these 
were in the end not the measures that were decisively positive from the point of view of the 
serviçais and tongas—and more so as the CAPs and the postcolonial inspectorate of labor 
did not seem to represent their interest. In social and economic terms, decolonization was 
unsurprisingly an immense disappointment—even if many of these problems stemmed 
from a lack of know-how among the new cadres of the independent state, which was in 
itself a result of the colonial conditions.79 On the side of remuneration, the daily wages of 
the workers would be raised from 28 to 80 São Tomean Escudos—but the wages lost their 
value, given that the currency now had a very low purchasing power.  
Worse, however, was the experience of loss of support that had, under the late co-
lonial state, increasingly been available from the part of the agents of the specialized labor 
services. The attitude towards the labor inspectorate, which had slowly become established 
as advocate of the populations in the late colonial period, again became negative. From the 
point of view of the plantation workers, the inspectors became—like those of the early 
1940s and the long and repressive preceding period—figures who were exclusively en-
gaged in questions of control and discipline. They did not seem to respond to complaints 
and they appeared only to protect those who held an interest in the exploitation of the labor 
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force, even if these were no longer capitalist plantation owners, but managers installed by a 
“people’s democracy.” Through the whole of the late 1970s, this disappointment became 
increasingly damaging and by 1981, the state of things had become endemic. The inhabit-
ants of the plantations did not participate in the popular disturbances of 1979 and 1981, as 
they were detached from the interest of the forros, some of which rebelled during these 
years against food scarcity and poverty. Nonetheless, they were negative towards the re-
gime and its executive agents, in the form of the labor inspectorate. The experience with 
the inspectors who, in the eyes of the laborers, represented the repressive attitudes the rul-
ing elites held towards them, widened the gap between the population on the plantations 
and the postcolonial urban or peri-urban society. In future, there would be no room for a 
consensus. 
This analysis of a former Portuguese colony and the evolution of its economic sys-
tem after independence allows us to draw some important conclusions for a broader view 
on decolonization processes and their effects on social relations in the postcolonial period. 
Even in a colonial state that was as authoritarian as the Portuguese Estado Novo, the im-
provement of labor conditions, through the abolition of practices that could be described as 
a kind of “forced labour,” did not fail to leave an impact. Serviçais in São Tomé e Príncipe 
were not content with the labor conditions they had by 1974. However, they recognized the 
improvement in their living conditions under the late colonial state, and began to rely on 
specialized services, notably the labor inspectorate, which in the late colonial state had 
become a key interlocutor for the needs of the laborers. 
After independence, the populations on the plantations utilized this experience as a 
scale against which to measure the behavior of postcolonial bureaucratic elites. When the 
practices of regulating the labor force after independence reminded them strongly of the 
phase of active “forced labour” under Portuguese rule, this appears to have caused negative 
comparisons and, at least, passive resistance. In the end, the effect of these perceptions 
helped to alienate a part of the “civil society” from the decision-makers in the political 
centers. Given the similarities in the history of the abolition of forced labor under different 
colonial regimes, it is plausible to conclude that there were analogous experiences in sev-
eral sub-Saharan African countries immediately after independence. From this perspective 
the effects of the late colonial state in other former colonial territories still need to be in-
vestigated. 
 
